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Beyond Justice
Reading Alma 42 in the Context
of Atonement Theories

Mark D. Ellison

I

n Alma 42, Alma teaches his son Corianton about the atonement
in a statement laden with legal vocabulary. Terms such as law,
judged, just, justice, injustice, punishment, probationary, and penitent
dominate the message, in company with such concepts as the execution of the law, the infliction of punishment, and punishment being
affixed to violation of law. By all appearances, Alma sets forth what
theologians call a juridical view of atonement (one concerned with
the administration of justice). The problem as Alma states it is that
“all mankind were fallen” and because of disobedience were “in the
grasp of justice” and “cut off” from God’s presence. The solution,
Alma says, is that “God himself atoneth for the sins of the world, to
bring about the plan of mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that
God might be a perfect, just God, and a merciful God also” (Alma
42:14–15). On their face, Alma’s statements seem typical of classical juridical conceptualizations of the atonement. However, a close,
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contextualized reading of his statements and the larger argument in
which they appear reveals that Alma actually challenges certain legalistic ways of understanding the atonement and divine justice, even
as he draws upon valuable aspects of a juridical view in order to help
his son understand what he must do to receive God’s gift of salvation.
Nevertheless, among members of The Church of Jesus Christ
Latter-day Saints, Alma 42 has often been used as a basis for teaching a rather rigid, transactional, legal model of salvation focused on
the demands of law and the satisfaction of justice, a model that has at
times become a dominant and almost default way of understanding
the atonement in Church discourse.1 Its popularity parallels a trend
in broader Christianity, from the Middle Ages to the present, to view
atonement primarily as the satisfaction of divine justice through
“substituted punishment.” 2
Alma’s framing of atonement in Alma 42 is not the only way
scriptural authors have understood this centrally important subject.
It isn’t even the only way Alma himself taught about it. While teaching people in the land of Gideon, for example, Alma described the
atonement in very different terms that movingly emphasized divine
empathy and succor (Alma 7:11–13). In both the Book of Mormon
and the Bible, we find diverse metaphors and models of atonement.
Authors variously describe Christ’s redemptive act as a payment,
sacrifice, vicarious suffering, victory, means of healing, means of liberation, or means of reconciliation, to name a few. Theologians have
drawn upon these metaphors or models of salvation to formulate
broad theories that conceptualize atonement primarily as a kind of
ransom, a satisfaction of justice, or a means of moral transformation.3
Surprisingly, the presence of such a diversity of views has not posed
much of a problem in Christian history. On matters of the person of
Christ, Christians have debated, held synods, called councils, hammered out creeds to define orthodox positions, and divided into factions over theological differences. But when it comes to the work of
Christ, Christians have generally agreed that Christ saves, without
conclusively defining how or enshrining any single explanation as
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correct.4 “The central Christian belief,” C.S. Lewis wrote, “is that
Christ’s death has somehow put us right with God and given us a
fresh start. Theories as to how it did this are another matter. A good
many different theories have been held as to how it works; what all
Christians are agreed on is that it does work.” 5
Along similar lines, President Dieter F. Uchtdorf stated, “I have
tried to understand the Savior’s atonement with my finite mind,
and the only explanation I can come up with is this: God loves us
deeply, perfectly, and everlastingly. I cannot even begin to estimate
‘the breadth, and length, and depth, and height . . . [of] the love of
Christ.’” 6 Finite minds, even brilliant ones, can scarcely be expected
to comprehend “an infinite atonement.” 7 We might think of the
ancient Buddhist fable in which blind men feel different parts of an
elephant and come to different conclusions about what an elephant
is: the man at the elephant’s side thinks an elephant is like a wall, the
one at its leg thinks an elephant is like a tree, the one at the trunk
says the elephant is like a snake, and so on.8 They each capture some
partial truth based on their own experience, but each one’s explanation is incomplete. The elephant is larger than they are yet able to
perceive. Spiritually, all of us in mortality see imperfectly, “through a
glass, darkly” (1 Corinthians 13:12). The infinite atonement, broader
and greater than human minds can conceive of in its entirety, is not
reducible to one single metaphor, model, or theory. Not only is God’s
redeeming love more vast than we can comprehend, but human needs,
experiences, and minds are more diverse than one model can contain.
Receiving the testimony of multiple scriptural witnesses gives us a
rich, fuller, more complex view than any single approach by itself.9
At the same time, there is value in considering individual, distinctive
views of atonement like the one in Alma 42; in context, we can often
perceive why a particular approach is meaningful in a given author’s
circumstances while remaining open to consider its limits and the
potential merit of other models.
This chapter contextualizes Alma’s teachings in Alma 42 within
the Book of Mormon narrative and within the long Christian
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conversation on theories of atonement. After overviewing scriptural
models and theological theories of atonement, I will examine Alma’s
discussion of atonement in Alma 42; explore ways Alma steers away
from a view of atonement in which God is punitive and toward a
broader understanding of divine justice that includes mercy, grace,
and compassion; and compare this to Alma’s teachings on atonement
elsewhere. Reading Alma 42 closely as well as seeing it in its broader
context yields an appreciation for the richness of the scriptural witness on the atonement, with a healthier overall balance and greater
insight into how it applies to people in widely diverse circumstances.

Scriptural Models of Salvation
In the earliest writings of the New Testament, the undisputed letters of Paul, we already find multiple ways of conceptualizing Christ’s
redemptive act. Paul employed different models of atonement to
advance various arguments he made to different groups of people.
Sometimes he interwove disparate metaphors in a single passage.10
For him and many Christian authors after him, differing models of
atonement were not exclusive categories but could overlap and serve
as multiple approaches to understanding salvation.

The judicial analogy
In places, Paul uses courtroom terminology to illustrate the process
of salvation. The problem is sin: all human beings, Jew and Gentile,
have violated divine law and stand guilty before God, sentenced to
death (Romans 3:9–10, 23; 6:23). The solution is God’s gracious gift
of Jesus Christ, who died as an “atonement” (Romans 3:25 NRSV;
KJV “propitiation”). When human beings accept this gift by faith,
placing their trust in God and in Christ, they are “ justified”—placed
in a right standing with God in which they receive a remission of sins
and in effect are given the verdict of not guilty (Romans 3:24–25).11
(This model, of course, provides a major basis for more expanded juridical theories of atonement in later centuries.)
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The participationist model
In other places, Paul frames the human problem as a struggle against
the cosmic, unseen powers of sin and death. Christ won a decisive
victory over these destructive forces through his death and resurrection. By placing faith in Christ and joining with him, human beings,
on their own powerless against sin and death, find saving power in
Christ and participate in his victory. When Paul speaks of being “in
Christ” or undergoing things “with Christ,” he is employing participationist thinking. For example, through baptism we experience a type
of Christ’s death and resurrection, and thereafter share in Christ’s
victory and “newness of life” (Romans 6:3–4; 8:1; 1 Corinthians 15:57;
Galatians 2:20).

Recapitulation and transformation of humanity
Paul describes Christ as a second Adam who reversed the effects of
the fall by acting in obedience while Adam had been disobedient
(Romans 5:12–21; 1 Corinthians 15:21–22, 45–49). Because of this,
human beings can come to Christ and be regenerated in “a new crea
tion” (2 Corinthians 5:17 NRSV; Galatians 6:15).12

The great exchange
Paul also writes about Christ’s saving act as a benevolent exchange
in which Christ took humanity’s burden and in turn gave humanity
his blessedness and righteousness. The idea of vicarious atonement
figures importantly in this approach; Christ somehow assumed a role
or took on a burden in humanity’s place. Paul sometimes uses chiastic
poetry to describe the dramatic reversal of fortunes resulting from
this exchange: “[God] made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that
we might be made the righteousness of God in him” (2 Corinthians
5:21); “Though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye
through his poverty might be rich” (2 Corinthians 8:9).
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Reconciliation
Paul sometimes describes salvation as the reconciliation of God
and humanity, two parties who had been alienated from each other
(Romans 5:10; 2 Corinthians 5:18–20). Here the main problem is
estrangement from God, and the main objective of salvation is to
restore connection, belonging, relationship with God.13 Like two
people at odds with each other over some disagreement or offense
might be restored to friendship through the intervention of a mediator figure, so humanity is reconciled to deity, its relationship to God
mended through the intercession of Jesus Christ.

Sacrifice
Drawing upon the imagery of animal sacrifices performed in the
Jerusalem temple, which were described as making atonement (covering) for the sins of the people (Leviticus 19:22; 1 Chronicles 6:49;
2 Chronicles 29:24), Paul describes Jesus’s death as “a sacrifice of
atonement” (Romans 3:25 NRSV; KJV “propitiation,” also “expiation”). The author of Hebrews uses this same metaphor, though in a
different way, arguing that Christ’s “once for all” sacrifice for sins was
superior to the animal sacrifices that had to be offered year after year
in the temple (Hebrews 10:1–18).

Ransom/Redemption
In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus states that the Son of Man had come
“to give his life a ransom for many” (Mark 10:45). The Greek word
translated “ransom” (lytron) refers to the manumission price paid to
free a slave, a prisoner of war, or a captive debtor.14 Paul, too, used a
form of this term in stating that Christ’s death brought “redemption”
(apolýtrōsis, Romans 3:24; 8:23), a buying-back, a release secured by
payment of ransom. In this view, the problem is that sin results in
a kind of debt or captivity, and the solution is the perfect payment
made by the Son of God. However, these New Testament passages
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do not specify whether the ransom is paid to God, to Satan, or to
some other figurative creditor such as justice.

Healing
In places, scriptural authors refer to Christ’s saving work primarily as
healing. In this view, humanity is spiritually and physically wounded
by sin, death, and the hardships and injustices of life; Christ is the
great physician who restores the wounded to wholeness.15 As Jesus
announced at the beginning of his ministry, “[The Lord] hath sent
me to heal the brokenhearted” (Luke 4:18; see Matthew 4:23; 13:15;
Mark 2:17; John 12:40; 3 Nephi 18:32).

Theories of Atonement
Drawing upon the preceding diverse biblical metaphors and models,
theologians have developed overarching theories of atonement that
can be grouped into three main categories: Christ the Victor, juridical satisfaction, and moral transformation.16 One way to understand
the basic differences between these three main theories (as theologians have pointed out) is that each in turn emphasizes what people
have thought to be the demands of Satan, the demands of God, and
the needs of humanity.17

Christ the Victor
Swedish theologian Gustaf Aulén’s important 1931 book Christus
Victor brought culminating expression to a view that drew upon key
New Testament passages and the writings of Christian thinkers from
the second century forward.18 The Christ-the-Victor conception of
the atonement seems to have been the earliest and most dominant
view until the twelfth-century rise of scholastic philosophy. In this
view, disobedience brought humanity under the devil’s power and
hold, but Christ saved humanity by winning a victory over the devil
(see Mark 3:27). Various authors have seen the death and resurrection of Christ as achieving victory, paying a debt, winning a spiritual
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battle, or playing a trick on the devil. This last view, an ancient one,
held that through the crucifixion God fooled the devil or made a bargain with him. Many Christians in modern times have not felt comfortable with this view, but in its favor, it and other Christ-the-Victor
viewpoints do address what countless people have learned through
their own experience—that sin seems to hold tremendous power
over us and we need God’s help to overcome it.19

Juridical satisfaction
Around AD 1100 a Benedictine monk, Anselm of Canterbury, explained atonement using medieval concepts of honor in feudal society.20 Humans owe God obedience like vassals who vow fealty to
their local lord in his castle; disobedience dishonors God and requires either punishment or some form of satisfaction. Since humans
owe God everything, theirs is an infinite debt that only the divine
Son of God can pay. During the Protestant Reformation, Martin
Luther and John Calvin expressed similar ideas, but favored the imagery of monetary debts or legal proceedings. Instead of honor that
needed to be satisfied, they focused on divine wrath that demanded
punishment; Christ bore God’s wrath on the cross as a substitute for
sinners, whose guilt was transferred to him. These ideas formed the
basis for what has come to be known as the penal substitution model,
or substitutionary atonement. While this view does draw upon many
scriptural ideas (the problem of sin, the image of divine wrath, justice/justification, the suffering of Christ, “great exchange” passages),
it seems at odds with other scriptural truths (the love and unity between the Father and the Son and the benevolence of God) and raises
concerns about divine complicity with violence and cruelty.21 One
Christian theologian writes, “The risk of this account is that, if distorted, it can make ‘God’ or ‘God the Father’ seem like the villain of
the story, with Christ the hero who wins our freedom.” 22 According
to two other theologians, “The logic of punishment, which requires
the Son to bear the Father’s wrath, has been criticized not only for its
moral and legalistic rigidity, which engenders guilt as a condition for
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forgiveness and denies that God is free to forgive, but [also] as a form
of ‘divine child abuse,’ a projection of the worst human impulses.” 23
Though an understanding of atonement as vicarious punishment has
become the prevailing view among most Protestants and Catholics,
the shortcomings of this view have led many Christian thinkers over
the past millennium to contemplate alternative ways of understanding atonement.

Moral transformation
In the twelfth century, French theologian Peter Abelard objected to
the apparent cruelty of prevailing views of atonement.24 Rather than
focusing on Christ’s suffering and death as substituted punishment,
he emphasized its effects on human hearts. The crucifixion demonstrated the depths of God’s love for humanity. When this divine love
is really understood, it inspires life-changing gratitude and the will to
live a godly life. Thus, Abelard and theologians who have followed in
his steps are said to have developed a moral transformation or moral
influence theory of atonement. While avoiding the problem of implying that God is violent or cruel, a strictly moral-influence view
risks reducing Christ to a mere example and raises questions about
whether Christ’s suffering and death were necessary or accomplished
anything objective.25

Modifying the Juridical View in Alma 42
The issue that calls forth Alma’s juridical explanation of atonement in
Alma 42 is his son Corianton’s misgivings “concerning the justice of
God in the punishment of the sinner”; Corianton thought it was “injustice that the sinner should be consigned to a state of misery” (Alma
42:1). Corianton may have been influenced by Nehorite universalism
(teachings that God would save all humanity; Alma 1:4) or doctrines
of Korihor (that there is no such thing as sin, and therefore no need
for Christ or an atonement; Alma 30:12, 17).26 This would explain
Corianton’s objection to the idea of “the punishment of the sinner”
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(Alma 42:1). More crucially, Corianton was at odds with God; his
understanding of punishment was such that he thought God was not
just, fair, or right in his actions and character. As much as Corianton
needed to understand divine justice, he also needed his relationship
with God to be mended; he needed reconciliation and healing.
Alma dismantles Corianton’s misconceptions by teaching the
reality of sin, human agency, and accountability for choices. He
begins (in Alma 42:2–12) by appealing to the story of the first parents in Eden—for Alma, the paradigmatic story for understanding
human agency, justice, and redemption. The fall was not a punishment God had imposed on the first parents but a consequence “which
man had brought upon himself because of his own disobedience” (Alma
42:12; emphasis added throughout).27 This teaching resonates with
other Book of Mormon passages emphasizing that it is not God
who punishes so much as human beings who by doing iniquity bring
destructive consequences upon themselves (see Helaman 14:29–31;
Alma 3:19, 26–27; 41:7).
Alma next segues into discussing justice and how the atonement appeases justice and makes mercy possible (Alma 42:13–15).
Here Alma employs terms used in juridical and satisfaction models of atonement, but he does so with a twist. As discussed above,
traditional juridical models risk giving the impression that God is
wrathful, punitive, and uncompassionate; that God the Father cruelly punished Christ; and that atonement is a cold mathematical
equation, mechanistic in its workings, and controlled by such abstract
parameters as law and the satisfaction of justice. Alma avoids or
reduces these problems by continuing to emphasize human agency,
by carefully distinguishing between the demands of justice and the
acts of God, and most important, by describing atonement in a way
that provokes a new understanding of justice.
It is instructive to notice the use of active and passive voice in the
verbs in Alma’s discussion. Man “brought upon himself ” the fallen
state “because of his own disobedience” (Alma 42:12). The active
voice here underscores agency—human actions and their results. The
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consequences of the fallen state, however, appear in passive voice: “it
was appointed unto man to die”; “our first parents were cut off both
temporally and spiritually from the presence of the Lord” (Alma 42:6,
7, 9, 11). The passive voice depersonalizes justice; the consequences are
not punishments God inflicted but results the first parents brought
about by their own actions.28 Throughout the chapter, the passive
voice continues to decouple consequences and demands of justice
from the person of God, in the process distinguishing Alma’s view
of atonement from those built upon concepts of divine wrath: “there
was a punishment affixed”; “it shall be restored unto him according
to his deeds”; “evil shall be done unto him” (Alma 42:18, 22, 27, 28).29
Elsewhere, similar distancing is accomplished by abstraction; it is not
God who punishes, but “the law inflicteth the punishment” (Alma
42:22).30 But abstractions receive less emphasis than persons with
agency. Alma uses the active voice to call attention to the actions of
the principal agents in the process of salvation—God and human
beings (by their response to God).
Within Alma’s entire discussion in Alma 42 there are only three
actions God himself takes overtly, each indicated using the active
voice: First, God “drew out the man, and he placed at the east end
of the garden of Eden, cherubim, and a flaming sword” (Alma 42:2).
Alma presents this as a merciful act; it gave humanity “a probationary
time, a time to repent” (Alma 42:4; compare 42:22). Second, in order
to rescue humanity from “the grasp of justice” and bring about “the
plan of mercy,” “God himself atoneth for the sins of the world” (Alma
42:14–15). Here Alma does not describe salvation as Jesus Christ suffering a punishment demanded by God the Father; the words Father,
Jesus, and Christ do not appear at all in Alma 42. Rather, Alma points
to God himself making atonement, consistent with the Nephite
Christology that describes Christ as God; for example, Abinadi
taught that “God himself shall come down among the children of men,
and shall redeem his people” (Mosiah 15:1).31 Of course Alma understood Jesus Christ to be the atoning savior and refers to Christ by
name in places throughout Alma 39–41, but as he takes up a juridical
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approach to atonement in Alma 42, he avoids one of the biggest problems with the model—the risk of implying God the Father’s cruelty
toward his Son. If one adopts the Nephite perspective that God, the
Creator himself, assumed the burden of making atonement for all his
creation in order to redeem all who are willing to repent, much of the
potential problem with juridical ways of thinking about atonement is
resolved. Third, “God bringeth about his great and eternal purposes,”
one of which is “the salvation and the redemption of men,” the other
implicitly being the preservation of agency, leaving the possibility
that human beings may choose not to repent, to their “destruction
and misery” (Alma 42:26).
Fittingly, then, Alma also employs the active voice when describing the human response and the freedom to choose—humans can
repent (Alma 42:17): “whosoever will come may come and partake of
the waters of life freely; and whosoever will not come the same is not
compelled to come” (Alma 42:27). Alma uses active imperatives in his
closing admonition to his son: “Let these things trouble you no more,”
he urges, regarding Corianton’s prior misgivings about punishment
and God’s justice. “Only let your sins trouble you, with that trouble
which shall bring you down unto repentance. . . . do not endeavor to
excuse yourself ” (Alma 42:29–30).
In this version of a juridical model of atonement, Alma, as Terryl
Givens observes, “develops a doctrine of the atonement in such
a way as to reclaim the principle of justice from a kind of Platonic
abstraction or the equivalence with God himself and to situate it in
the context of human agency. This may well be one of [the Book of
Mormon’s] greatest theological contributions.” 32

A Broader Understanding of God’s Justice
Alma’s teaching also beckons Corianton and us as readers to expand
our understanding of divine justice. One could take away from Alma
42 a narrow view of divine justice based on a simple dichotomy of
justice versus mercy—an idea that these two concepts are competing
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opposites and that since God is just and mercy cannot rob justice,
divine justice must be defined and defended in rigorist terms. One
commentator on Alma 42 states, “To be just, God must impartially
mete out rewards or punishments in relation to his children’s obedience or disobedience.” 33 Is this really a fair description of God’s activity or character? The repeated refrain of God’s people seems to
indicate otherwise: “The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy. . . . He hath not dealt with us after our
sins; nor rewarded us according to our iniquities” (Psalm 103:8, 10; compare Exodus 34:6–7). On one occasion God’s people even confessed,
“Thou our God hast punished us less than our iniquities deserve” (Ezra
9:13). The rigid definition of God’s justice cited above stems from a
simplistic reading of Alma 42 and does not account for the mercy and
graciousness that is also part of the divine nature.
At first glance, Alma does seem to present justice and mercy as
separate vying interests, but this presentation occurs beneath the
umbrella of a rhetorical strategy that resembles one used by other
theological thinkers in Christian history. Anselm constructed his
logic of atonement remoto Christo, “apart from Christ” or “with
Christ at a remove,” discussing the human condition as if there were
no Christ and no atonement as a way of clarifying the difference
Christ makes.34 Several scriptural authors employ a similar strategy,
describing what humanity’s fate would be without God’s intervention—without Christ or an atonement.35 In parts of Alma 42, Alma
employs a kind of remoto Christo logic. We see this in his statement,
“If it were not for the plan of redemption, (laying it aside) . . .” (Alma
42:11). In the course of this reasoning, justice and mercy are separate vying forces only theoretically—in the hypothetical situation
in which there is no Christ and no atonement—but of course Alma
holds the atonement to be a reality and thus holds God to be both just
and merciful, “a perfect, just God, and a merciful God also” (Alma
42:15).
In Alma’s discussion, justice and mercy may also appear to be
separate vying forces when human beings refuse to repent (see Alma
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42:22–24). Again, however, this hypothetical situation is part of a rhetorical strategy, in this case an argument of sine paenitentia—without
repentance, human beings cannot receive God’s mercy in its fullness
and thus remain subject to the claims of justice. It is the choice to
repent, to turn to God, that opens us to receive the full measure of
God’s gifts. This logic is central to how Alma exhorts Corianton to
repent. But it is important to notice that this separation of justice
from mercy is not found in the character or activity of God; it results
only in the experience of the human being who chooses not to receive
the mercy that is always part of God’s activity and character.
Alma’s statements that set justice and mercy as opposites are
midpoints in his reasoning, but they are not where he is trying to
direct Corianton or us as readers. By the end of the chapter, he is
pointing toward a more integrated view that urges an understanding
of God’s redemptive action as at once just and merciful: “let the justice of God, and his mercy, and his long-suffering have full sway in your
heart” (Alma 42:30). The atonement shows God to be “a perfect, just
God, and a merciful God also” (Alma 42:15). Alma urges Corianton
to see God’s justice, mercy, and long-suffering not in isolation but in
combination, as a holistic quality of God that can have full sway in
one’s heart with transforming effect.
I do not think Alma is merely saying that justice and mercy are,
as one writer described them, “compatible qualities in God,” but that
justice and mercy in combination can itself be seen as a higher definition of
divine justice.36 If we believe that God’s thoughts are not ours, and his
ways are not ours, but are higher than ours (Isaiah 55:8–9), we should
expect his concept of justice to be beyond what we tend to imagine.37
Our metaphors drawn from courtrooms and the activities of human
lawyers and judges may serve to a point, but will hardly capture what
an infinitely good God means by justice. Alma points to a divine
rightness that includes mercy. If we think of justice as connoting
rightness, we may see divine justice more broadly as God’s way of
righting what is wrong and establishing rightness, or righteousness,
and may readily appreciate that fixing what is wrong in us will take

Beyond Justice

35

mercy. Both the Hebrew term tzedeqah used in the Old Testament
and the Greek dikaiosynē used in the New Testament, with their variants, imply not just justice or justification but more broadly this very
sense of rightness.
Jesus taught and embodied this higher sense of justice in many
instances, one of the clearest being his parable of the laborers in
the vineyard (Matthew 20:1–16). Those who worked only one hour
received a full day’s wages, as did those who had worked all day. In a
sense, the master’s actions were not fair, not strictly just—and that is
the whole point. The master was not just according to narrow, human
ways of thinking based strictly on merit; he was just by generously,
graciously providing what each one of his willing day laborers desperately needed.38 In this he established rightness. Grace and mercy are
not alternatives or rivals to divine justice; they are essential parts of
it. That is what Alma urges Corianton to recognize, and what Jesus
describes. The master of the vineyard represents God’s way of setting
things right; he embodies a concept of divine justice that surpasses
narrow, human notions by establishing what is right with generosity—enacting justice and mercy.

Unaddressed Needs Pointing beyond Alma 42
The curious reader of Corianton’s story may be left with a number
of unanswered questions. As Alma concludes teaching his son, he
states that Corianton’s calling “to preach the word unto this people”
remains in place (or is now restored; Alma 42:31). Later references to
Corianton in the Book of Mormon describe him as a faithful, upright
man of God; all indications are that he forsook his sins and led a
transformed life.39 The Book of Mormon narrative does not provide
an account of how this took place; we have three accounts of young
Alma’s own dramatic repentance (Mosiah 27; Alma 36, 38) but nothing comparable in Corianton’s story. Yet close examination of Alma
42 has suggested that Alma’s explanation of the interworkings of justice, law, agency, punishment, and mercy addressed what was not just

36

Mark D. Ellison

an intellectual hurdle for Corianton, not merely doctrinal misconceptions, but more importantly Corianton’s own strained relationship with God. His father’s teachings helped him (in a way implied
but not made explicit in the text) come to a new understanding of
God’s character, feel swayed by that understanding (Alma 42:30), and
be reconciled to God.
In this respect, Alma’s teaching in Alma 42 reduces a major problem with juridical theories of atonement, though it does not escape
the problem entirely: juridical models do not generally address how
the atonement transforms a person’s life. They attempt to explain a
logic of redemption from a legal point of view; they do less to address
human needs. Even after Alma has somewhat tempered the cold
arithmetic of the juridical model by pointing to examples of God’s
compassion in the process—God’s merciful granting of time to
repent, God’s respect for human agency, God’s graciousness in making atonement himself to redeem humanity—the explanation by itself
remains a relatively cerebral, mechanistic way of understanding salvation. Yet Corianton and all human beings are not merely intellectual;
we are emotional, spiritual, physical, irrational, and impulsive. All
these sides of us need transforming in the process of repentance and
redemption. That Corianton does experience such transformation
indicates that, in addition to what we can infer from Alma 42, there
is more to his story than we read here. The content of Alma 42 points
beyond itself to other passages that must be considered alongside it.
Alma himself provides the reader of the Book of Mormon a rich
supply of additional material on atonement. In Alma 7, Alma teaches
a humble, believing people in the land of Gideon (Alma 6:8; 7:6). To
this faithful audience, whose needs differ from Corianton’s, Alma
teaches of Christ’s redemption in remarkably different terms from
those he used in Alma 42; the words law, justice, punishment, probationary, and penitent make no appearance. Rather, Alma emphasizes
the full range of human suffering that Christ would experience, the
divine empathy Christ would acquire by this, and thus the perfect
ability Christ has to succor human beings in all their infirmities and
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difficulties (see Alma 7:11–13). In this empathy and succor model,
the atonement addresses not just the problem of human sin but also
of human pain, sicknesses, weakness—physical and spiritual—and
mortality. Christ would suffer “pains and afflictions and temptations
of every kind; . . . the pains and the sicknesses of his people”; he would
“take upon him death, that he may loose the bands of death which
bind his people”; he would “take upon him their infirmities, that his
bowels may be filled with mercy, according to the flesh, that he may
know according to the flesh how to succor his people according to
their infirmities” (Alma 7:11–12). Alma mentions sin last: Christ
would suffer “that he might take upon him the sins of his people, that
he might blot out their transgressions according to the power of his
deliverance” (Alma 7:13).40
In Alma 5, Alma addresses the people in the land of Zarahemla,
where he saw wickedness in the church (Alma 4:8–12). Though he
does discuss judgment (Alma 5:15–36), Alma does not teach a juridical model of atonement to this group of people; the words law, justice,
punishment, probationary, and penitent once again do not appear in this
sermon. Rather, as Alma teaches about “the blood of Christ, who will
come to redeem his people from their sins” (Alma 5:27), he focuses on
describing the transforming effects of the atonement, using a broad
palette of metaphors: to be changed by Christ is to have a mighty
change of heart, to awaken out of a deep sleep, to awaken unto God,
to have one’s soul “illuminated by the light of the everlasting word,” to
have the bands of death broken and the chains of hell loosed, to have
one’s soul expand, to sing redeeming love, to be born of God, and to
receive his image in one’s countenance (Alma 5:7, 9, 14). Alma knew
these transformative effects in a personal way, through his own experience of being rescued by Christ from pain and darkness and being
brought to joy and light (Mosiah 27:23–29; Alma 36:10–20; 38:6–8).
Reading these and other scriptural passages in company with
Alma 42, we might fill in the gaps of Corianton’s story and imagine
the spiritual transformation and succor that came to him as he came
to understand God’s character and the need to repent. We might also
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recognize with the apostle Paul that legalistic ways of thinking about
salvation are inadequate. Paul came to realize that one had to move
beyond letter to spirit, beyond questions of one’s legal standing with
God to a trusting and transformative relationship with God, beyond
justification to sanctification. The basis of faith had to shift from the
Torah to Christ. “For God has done what the law . . . could not do: by
sending his own Son” (Romans 8:3 NRSV).

Conclusion: Embracing the Multiplicity of Views
I believe that situating Alma 42 among other scriptural and historical
explanations of atonement yields insights that are crucially important in religious education and pastoral care. To illustrate this, I share
with permission an experience of one of my students. When he was
seventeen years old and just a few weeks from beginning his full-time
mission for the Church, he was driving to his early-morning seminary
class when, while making a turn, he accidentally struck a man on a
motorcycle. There was a moment of shock and confusion over what
had just happened, then the tumultuous accident scene of witnesses,
police, an ambulance, and the horrifying realization that the motorcycle driver had died on impact. My student was devastated at what
he had done. He wept in anguish, and in the days and weeks that
followed he agonized over the guilt he felt. Thoughts of the atonement pressed upon his mind, but he could not understand how the
atonement could help him when what he had done had been an accident, not a deliberate act. “I hadn’t sinned,” he said. “I didn’t need to
repent.” Yet he could feel no comfort in this, but only a crushing grief.
That finally began to change when he came to realize that Christ’s
salvation included more than forgiveness of sin, that it also brought
healing to broken hearts and strength to deal with mortal difficulties
apart from sin. Alma’s teachings in Alma 7:11–12 were key to his realization, and it began to bring him a sense of peace. Somehow, prior
to then, his church experience had given him the impression that the
atonement was exclusively about sin and forgiveness.41
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That is an impression one might get from Alma 42 alone (and
the talks and media resources based on it), especially without close,
contextualized reading. But Alma’s juridical exposition, as we have
seen, was given with nuance in a very particular context; in other
settings, to other audiences with different needs, Alma taught about
atonement differently. Awareness of this should steer us away from
imposing any single model as the one exclusive or preferred way of
understanding salvation. For a friend of mine who left the Church,
one of the reasons for his disaffection was discomfort with the violence and cruelty of God implied in a rigid, penal-substitution view
of atonement. Though our scriptures and heritage preserve other
ways of thinking about atonement, the overemphasis given to that
view in his church experience eventually became harmful to his
faith. We will be more edifying teachers and fellow saints if, instead
of reading superficially or insisting dogmatically upon a single way
of understanding the infinite atonement, we will appreciate and
embrace the rich subtlety and variety of views we have in our scriptural and historical inheritance and affirm the essential proclamation of the good news of Christ. B. H. Roberts stated (quoting a
saying dating to the early seventeenth century), “In essentials let
there be unity; in non-essentials, liberty; and in all things, charity.” 42 The essential gospel message is that Christ’s suffering, death,
and resurrection are redemptive and healing. Theories, models, and
metaphors used to explain how they work are, as C. S. Lewis said,
“mere plans or diagrams to be left alone if they do not help us, and,
even if they do help us, not to be confused with the thing itself.” 43
With charity, we might remember that some particular way of
understanding atonement may be valued or needed by one person,
but less helpful for another. Alma himself, a tireless minister of
the word from the time Christ rescued him and transformed his
life, would be less interested in theories of the atonement than in
whether our souls, this day, are alive with its effects.
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2:17–18; 4:14–16.
41. A similar story appears in Hafen, Broken Heart, 10, in a chapter entitled,
“The Atonement Is Not Just for Sinners.” Interestingly, there are indications that the description of atonement in Alma 7 is rising in popularity in
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0

1980s
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15

1990s

23
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31
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2010s, through 2017

24
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